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On the Impossibility of Deterrence in Sequential 
Colonel Blotto Games
Kjell Hausken
A sequential Colonel Blotto and rent seeking game with ﬁxed and variable resources is 
analyzed. With ﬁxed resources, which is the assumption in Colonel Blotto games, we 
show for the common ratio form contest success function that the second mover is never 
deterred. This stands in contrast to Powell’s (Games and Economic Behavior 67(2), 
611–615) ﬁnding where the second mover can be deterred. With variable resources both 
players exert eﬀorts in both sequential and simultaneous games, whereas ﬁxed resources 
cause characteristics of all battleﬁelds or rents to impact eﬀorts for each battleﬁeld. 
With variable resources only characteristics of a given battleﬁeld impact eﬀorts are to 
win that battleﬁeld because of independence across battleﬁelds. Fixed resources impact 
eﬀorts and hence diﬀerences in unit eﬀort costs are less important. In contrast, variable 
resources cause diﬀerences in unit eﬀort costs to be important. The societal implication 
is that resource constrained opponents can be expected to engage in warfare, whereas 
an advantaged player with no resource constraints can prevent warfare.
Keywords: Blotto; multiple rents; ﬁxed resources; variable resources; rent seeking.
1. Introduction
Colonel Blotto games assume that two opponents allocate ﬁxed resources across
multiple battleﬁelds or prizes. Rent seeking for multiple prizes assumes either vari-
able or ﬁxed resources for each opponent. Both Colonel Blotto games and rent
seeking are commonly analyzed as simultaneous move games. Since many alloca-
tion situations are sequential, e.g., protecting infrastructures against attackers or
sequential bid for voters (Groseclose and Snyder, 1996), this paper seeks to under-
stand the diﬀerent implications. We ﬁrst position the problem within the literature.
Within the Colonel Blotto literature, with ﬁxed resources, Shubik and Weber
(1981) account for complementarities among defended targets and determine cost
trade-oﬀs between systems defense and alternative measures. Roberson (2006)
describe the equilibrium payoﬀs to the classic Colonel Blotto game for any number
of battleﬁelds, and any level of relative resources, assuming that each player’s payoﬀ
is the proportion of battleﬁelds to which the player sends a higher level of force.
Kvasov (2007) analyzes a ﬁrst-price simultaneous-move all-pay auction, where the
player submitting the highest bid for a given object wins that object. Robson (2005),
using a contest success function, analyzes two players’ resource allocation across a
collection or sequence of diﬀerent contests, and how interdependencies depend on
the contest success function and values of the prizes.
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Within the rent seeking literature, the following research assumes budget 
constraints. Che and Gale (1997) assume that each bidder has ﬁnite wealth and 
show that less intensive (decisive) rent seeking can cause more rent dissipation. Che 
and Gale (1998, 2006) and Kaplan and Wettstein (2006) show that exogenous caps 
in all-pay auctions reduces a high valuation bidder’s winning chances. Caps may also 
increase aggregate contributions and lower total surplus. With ﬁxed resources, 
Snyder (1989) analyzes simultaneous contests for legislative seats based on 
campaign strategies in multiple districts. Two parties maximize either the expected 
number of legislative seats, or the probability of winning a majority of the seats, 
which leads to qualitatively diﬀerent behavior.
With variable resources, the following research assumes a contest success 
function. Clark and Konrad (2007a) consider a model where two players exert 
eﬀorts in several dimensions. The player that wins a certain number of these 
dimensions is awarded a prize. Clark and Konrad (2007b) analyze a defender who 
needs to successfully defend all fronts, and an attacker who needs to win at only one 
front. They show that even with defender advantage on each front, the defender’s 
payoﬀ is zero if the number of fronts is large. Clark and Konrad (2008) investigate 
how multiple simultaneous R&D contests depend on whether ﬁrms already hold 
relevant patents and the availability of an option to invent around. Klumpp and 
Polborn (2006) analyze campaign spending in sequential and simultaneous elections 
in single state to determine candidates for US presidential elections. In an all-pay 
auction assuming simultaneous and sequential distribution, Clark and Riis (1998) 
consider competition for multiple identical rents, where each player can only win one 
rent.
Assuming a contest success function and ﬁxed resources it is easily shown that 
the sequence of moves does not aﬀect the agents’ choices and utilities, and no 
agent withdraws (i.e., exerts no eﬀort). With variable resources we show that the 
second mover can be deterred. With variable resources it is easily shown that the 
ﬁrst moving defender always prefers the sequential game, and the second moving 
attacker prefers the sequential game when he has a lower unit eﬀort cost than the 
defender. When one agent has moved in the sequential game, the game is predictable 
for the second mover, in contrast to an uncertain simultaneous move game where no 
agent knows the other agent’s eﬀort.
One rare exception to the assumption of simultaneous moves is Powell (2009). 
He analyzes a sequential Colonel Blotto game, where the defender moves ﬁrst and 
the attacker moves second. He assumes a contest success function diﬀerent from the 
one in the current paper, and thus gets diﬀerent results. He assumes that the 
probability that an attack on a given site succeeds depends only on the defensive 
resource
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allocated to that site, and not on the amount of resources the attacker allocates to
that site. However, the probability that the attacker attacks a given site depends on
the defender’s resource allocation. The defender’s loss and attacker’s gain depend
on multiplying these two probabilities, multiplying with a loss or gain value for
each site, and summing over all sites. The analysis shows that the defender min-
maxes the attacker causing a pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibrium where the
defender defends all sites, the attacker attacks all sites that are not well defended,
and refrains from attacking sites that are well protected.
In contrast, in the current paper we use the common ratio form contest success
function (Tullock 1980) to show that the attacker can never be deterred when
both players have ﬁxed resources which is the common assumption for Colonel
Blotto game. However, with variable resources, the attacker can be deterred. With
ﬁxed resources linkages between battleﬁelds or rents emerge, whereas with variable
resources each battleﬁeld is analyzed in isolation.a
Section 2 considers the model with ﬁxed resources, and Sec. 3 with variable
resources. Section 4 compares the results. Section 5 concludes.
2. A Model with fixed resources
2.1. The model
The defender has a resource r which is allocated into defense eﬀorts si ≥ 0 at unit
costs ai > 0 across n sites valued at Vi > 0, i = 1, . . . , n. Analogously, the attacker
has a resource R which is transformed into attack eﬀorts Si ≥ 0 at unit costs Ai > 0
across the n sites, i.e.,
n∑
i=1
aisi = r,
n∑
i=1
AiSi = R. (1)
Using the conventional ratio form contest success function (Tullock, 1980), the
defender defends site i successfully with probability
fi =


1/2 if si = Si = 0
si
si + Si
otherwise
, (2)
where ∂fi/∂si > 0, ∂fi/∂Si < 0. The attacker attacks site i successfully with the
remaining fraction 1− fi. The agents’ utilities are
u =
n∑
i=1
fiVi − r, U =
n∑
i=1
(1− fi)Vi −R, (3)
aFixed resources can be imposed by legislation, a social planner, by agreement between the
agents, and in principle also by each agent. President Barack Obama was the ﬁrst to decline
public funding for his 2008 campaign, though his motivation was partly to avoid the associated
spending limits which candidates have become masters of circumventing, http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/06/20/us/politics/20obamacnd.html, retrieved 10 December 2011.
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where fi is deﬁned in (2). We subtract r and R to compare with the game with
variable resources. We consider a two period game with complete and perfect infor-
mation. In period 1 the defender chooses si simultaneously for all n sites to maximize
his utility. In period 2 the attacker chooses Si simultaneously for all n sites, taking
as given the defender’s choices si in period 1. The two agents’ 2n − 2 free choice
variables are s1, . . . , sn−1 and S1, . . . , Sn−1 where sn and Sn follow from (1).
2.2. Solving the model
Applying backward induction to determine subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
Appendix A implies
Si =
R
Ai
Ai/R
ai/r
Vi
/(
Ai/R
ai/r
+ 1
)2
n∑
i=1
(
Ai/R
ai/r
Vi
/(
Ai/R
ai/r
+ 1
)2) , si = Ai/Rai/r Si,
u =
n∑
i=1
Ai/R
ai/r
Vi
Ai/R
ai/r
+ 1
− r, U =
n∑
i=1
Vi
Ai/R
ai/r
+ 1
−R.
(4)
Property 1. (a) The defender defends all sites and the attacker attacks all sites.
(b) ∂u/∂ai < 0, ∂2u/∂a2i > 0, ∂u/∂Ai > 0, ∂
2u/∂A2i < 0, ∂u/∂Vi > 0, ∂
2u/∂V 2i =
0, ∂u/∂r > 0 when
n∑
i=1
Ai/R
ai/r
Vi“
Ai/R
ai/r
+1
”2 > r, ∂2u/∂r2 < 0, ∂u/∂R < 0, ∂2u/∂R2 > 0,
∂U/∂Ai < 0, ∂2U/∂A2i > 0, ∂U/∂ai > 0, ∂
2U/∂a2i < 0, ∂U/∂Vi > 0, ∂
2U/∂V 2i = 0,
∂U/∂R > 0 when
n∑
i=1
Ai/R
ai/r
Vi“
Ai/R
ai/r
+1
”2 > R, ∂2U/∂R2 < 0, ∂U/∂r < 0, ∂2U/∂r2 > 0.
Proof. Follows from diﬀerentiating (4).
3. A Model with variable resources
3.1. The model
We consider the same game as in Sec. 2.1 except that the agents have variable
resources. Thus r and R do not apply and the agents have expenditures aisi and
AiSi for each site. We thus replace (3) with
u =
n∑
i=1
(fiVi − aisi), U =
n∑
i=1
((1 − fi)Vi −AiSi). (5)
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3.2. Solving the model
Applying backward induction to determine subgame perfect Nash equilibrium,
Appendix B implies
Si =


(2ai −Ai)Vi
4a2i
if Ai ≤ 2ai
0 if Ai ≥ 2ai
, si =


AiVi
4a2i
if Ai ≤ 2ai
Vi
Ai
if Ai ≥ 2ai
,
u =


n∑
i=1
AiVi
4ai
if Ai ≤ 2ai ∀ i
n∑
i=1
(
1− ai
Ai
)
Vi if Ai ≥ 2ai ∀ i
, (6)
U =


n∑
i=1
(2ai −Ai)2Vi
4a2i
if Ai ≤ 2ai ∀ i
0 if Ai ≥ 2ai ∀ i
.
Property 2. (a) When Ai ≤ 2ai ∀i, the attacker is not deterred and ∂u/∂ai < 0,
∂2u/∂a2i > 0, ∂u/∂Ai > 0, ∂
2u/∂A2i = 0, ∂u/∂Vi > 0, ∂
2u/∂V 2i = 0, ∂U/∂Ai < 0,
∂2U/∂A2i > 0, ∂U/∂ai > 0, ∂
2U/∂a2i > 0 when 4ai/3 < Ai < 2ai, ∂
2U/∂a2i < 0
when 0 < Ai < 4ai/3, ∂U/∂Vi > 0, ∂2U/∂V 2i = 0. (b) When Ai ≥ 2ai ∀i, the
attacker is deterred and ∂u/∂ai < 0, ∂2u/∂a2i = 0, ∂u/∂Ai > 0, ∂
2u/∂A2i < 0,
∂u/∂Vi > 0, ∂2u/∂V 2i = 0, U = 0.
Proof. Follows from diﬀerentiating (6).
If Ai ≤ 2ai for i = 1, . . . , j, which does not deter the attacker from these j sites,
and Ai ≥ 2ai for i = j + 1, . . . , n, which deters the attacker from the remaining
n− j sites, then the utilities are
u =
j∑
i=1
AiVi
4ai
+
n∑
i=j+1
(
1− ai
Ai
)
Vi, U =
j∑
i=1
(2ai −Ai)2Vi
4a2i
, 0 ≤ j ≤ n. (7)
4. Comparing properties 1 and 2
Property 1 states that an agent’s utility decreases convexly in his own unit eﬀort
cost and in the other agent’s resource, increases concavely in the other agent’s unit
eﬀort cost, increases linearly in the site valuation, and is inverse U formed in his
own resource. For the latter result, an agent with a small resource beneﬁts from a
larger resource, but as the resource exceeds the speciﬁed level, the budget constraint
is no longer binding and the agent prefers the model without budget constraints.
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Whereas Property 1 speciﬁes dependence on ﬁve parameters for each agent and
site (two unit eﬀort costs, the site valuation, and the two budget constraints),
Property 2 speciﬁes dependence on three parameters for each agent and site (two
unit eﬀort costs, the site valuation, and there are no budget constraints). Property 1
retains the symmetry between the ﬁrst and second mover, whereas Property 2 does
not. We ﬁrst consider Ai ≤ 2ai, which does not deter the second mover. Property 2
states that an agent’s utility decreases convexly in his own unit eﬀort cost, just as in
Property 1. However, the ﬁrst mover’s (the defender) utility increases linearly in the
second mover’s unit eﬀort cost, in contrast to increasing concavely in Property 1.
The second mover’s (the attacker’s) utility increases concavely in the ﬁrst mover’s
unit eﬀort cost when 0 < Ai < 4ai/3, just as in Property 1, but increases convexly
in the ﬁrst mover’s unit eﬀort cost when 4ai/3 < Ai < 2ai. This latter result means
that if the second mover is disadvantaged with a large unit eﬀort cost, below that
of being deterred, then it is especially beneﬁcial for the second mover that the ﬁrst
mover’s unit eﬀort cost increases. No such convex increase is present in Property 1.
Both agents’ utilities increase linearly in the site valuation, just as in Property 1.
Second, when Ai ≥ 2ai, which deters the second mover, the ﬁrst mover’s utility
decreases linearly in his own unit eﬀort cost, increases concavely in the second
mover’s unit eﬀort cost, and increases linearly in the site valuation. The deterred
second mover earns no utility. Appendix C shows further distinguishing factors.
5. Conclusion
The paper analyzes a sequential Colonel Blotto and rent seeking game with ﬁxed 
and variable resources relevant when a defender allocates resources across several 
diﬀerently valued battleﬁelds or rents before an attacker attacks. With ﬁxed 
resources, which is the assumption in Colonel Blotto games, we show for the common 
ratio form contest success function that the second mover cannot be deterred. The 
agents’ choices and utilities are the same in sequential and simultaneous games. This 
stands in contrast to Powell’s (2009) ﬁnding where the second mover can be 
deterred. With variable resources we show that the second mover is deterred (exerts 
no eﬀort) when disadvantaged with a unit eﬀort cost more than twice that of the ﬁrst 
mover. In the simultaneous game no agent withdraws. The societal implication is 
that resource constrained opponents can be expected to engage in warfare, whereas 
an advantaged player with no resource constraints can prevent warfare.
Fixed resources cause characteristics of all battleﬁelds or rents to impact eﬀorts
for each battleﬁeld where agents substitute eﬀorts across battleﬁelds, with variable
resources only characteristics of a given battleﬁeld impact eﬀorts to win that bat-
tleﬁeld because of independence across battleﬁelds. Fixed resources impact eﬀorts
and hence diﬀerences in unit eﬀort costs are less important. In contrast, variable
resources cause diﬀerences in unit eﬀort costs to be important.
With ﬁxed resources, agents earn maximum utilities for an intermediate value
of their own resource, since wasting a too large resource is costly, and a too small
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resource does not win a battleﬁeld. Although an agent with a small resource prefers
a larger resource, as the resource exceeds the speciﬁed level, the ﬁxed resource
which then becomes a budget constraint is no longer binding and the agent prefers
the model with variable resources. With variable resources, the optimization logic
prevents negative utilities and ensures intermediate optimal eﬀorts.
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Appendix A. Solving the game in Sec. 2
In order to diﬀerentiate with respect to Si, i = 1, . . . , n− 1, we write (3) as
U =
SiVi
si + Si
+
n−1∑
j=1,
j =i
SjVj
sj + Sj
+

R−AiSi−
Pn−1
j=1,
j =i
AjSj
An

Vn
r−aisi−
Pn−1
j=1,
j =i
ajsj
an
+
R−AiSi−
Pn−1
j=1,
j =i
AjSj
An
−R,
(A.1)
where the agents’ eﬀorts sn and Sn for n sites are expressed as functions of their
eﬀorts for sites 1, 2, . . . , n− 1. The attacker’s ﬁrst-order condition for Si for site i is
∂U
∂Si
=
SiVi
(si + Si)2
−

 r−aisi−
Pn−1
j=1,
j =i
ajsj
an



R−AiSi−
Pn−1
j=1,
j =i
AjSj
An

Vn
R−AiSi−
Pn−1
j=1,
j =i
AjSj
Ai



 r−aisi−
Pn−1
j=1,
j =i
ajsj
an

+

R−AiSi−
Pn−1
j=1,
j =i
AjSj
An




2 = 0
(A.2)
which is solved to yield
Si =
√
AianAnsi
(
r − aisi −
∑n−1
j=1,
j =i
ajsj
)
ViVn
Aian
[
AnVn
(
r − aisi −
∑n−1
j=1,
j =i
ajsj
)
−AiansiVi
]
×

An

r − aisi −
n−1∑
j=1,
j =i
ajsj

+ an

R + Aisi −
n−1∑
j=1,
j =i
AjSj




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−
Aiansi
[
an
(
R−∑n−1j=1,
j =i
AjSj
)
Vi + An
(
r − aisi −
∑n−1
j=1,
j =i
ajsj
)
(Vi + Vn)
]
Aian
[
AnVn
(
r − aisi −
∑n−1
j=1,
j =i
ajsj
)
−AiansiVi
]
(A.3)
The attacker’s second-order condition for Si is
∂2U
∂S2i
= − 2siVi
(si + Si)3
−
2A2i an

 r−aisi−
Pn−1
j=1,
j =i
ajsj
an

Vn
An



 r−aisi−
Pn−1
j=1,
j =i
ajsj
an

+

R−AiSi−
Pn−1
j=1,
j =i
AjSj
An




3 < 0
(A.4)
which is always satisﬁed. Inserting (A.3) i n t o ( 3) gives (after some tedious 
simpliﬁcations) the defender’s ﬁrst period utility
u =
n−1∑
j=1,
j =i
sjVj
sj + Sj
+
(
√
AiansiVi +
√
AnVn
(
r − aisi −
∑n−1
j=1,
j =i
ajsj
))2
An
(
r − aisi −
∑n−1
j=1,
j =i
ajsj
)
+ an
(
R + Aisi −
∑n−1
j=1,
j =i
AjSj
) − r.
(A.5)
Diﬀerentiating u with respect to si for site i, and equating with 0, gives
∂u
∂si
=
√
AiansiVi +
√
AnVn
(
r − aisi −
∑n−1
j=1,
j =i
ajsj
)
An
(
r − aisi −
∑n−1
j=1,
j =i
ajsj
)
+ an
(
R + Aisi −
∑n−1
j=1,
j =i
AjSj
)
×


√
AianVi√
si

An

r −
n−1∑
j=1,
j =i
ajsj

+ an

R−
n−1∑
j=1,
j =i
AjSj




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−
AnanVn
[
Ai
(
r −∑n−1j=1,
j =i
ajsj
)
+ ai
(
R−∑n−1j=1,
j =i
AjSj
)]
√
AnVn
(
r − aisi −
∑n−1
j=1,
j =i
ajsj
)

 = 0
(A.6)
which is solved to yield
si =

r −
n−1∑
j=1,
j =i
ajsj

AiVi

An

r −
n−1∑
j=1,
j =i
ajsj

+ an

R−
n−1∑
j=1,
j =i
AjSj




2/
d,
d = aiAiVi

An

r −
n−1∑
j=1,
j =i
ajsj

+ an

R−
n−1∑
j=1,
j =i
AjSj




2
+AnanVn

Ai

r −
n−1∑
j=1,
j =i
ajsj

+ ai

R−
n−1∑
j=1,
j =i
AjSj




2
(A.7)
Solving (A.7) and (A.3) gives
Si =
ai
(
R−∑n−1j=1,
j =i
AjSj
)
Ai
(
r −∑n−1j=1,
j =i
ajsj
) si = ai(AiSi + AnSn)
Ai(aisi + ansn)
si ⇒ aisi
AiSi
=
ansn
AnSn
, (A.8)
where (1) as equalities is used for the second equality. Equation (A.8) applies for
i = 1, . . . , n and is rewritten as
a1s1
A1S1
=
a2s2
A2S2
= · · · = ansn
AnSn
⇒ ajsj = aisi
AiSi
AjSj, i, j = 1, . . . , n. (A.9)
Equation (A.9) expresses how the agents’ eﬀorts for site j depend on each other,
and on si and Si. Inserting (A.9) into (1) gives
si =
Ai/R
ai/r
Si. (A.10)
Inserting (A.9) and (A.10) into (A.7) gives
S1 =
a1(Anr + anR)2V1
an(A1r + a1R)2Vn
Sn ⇒ Si = ai(Anr + anR)
2Vi
an(Air + aiR)2Vn
Sn. (A.11)
Inserting (A.11) into (1) gives
Sn =
R
An
An/R
an/r
Vn
/(
An/R
an/r
+ 1
)2
∑n
i=1
(
Ai/R
ai/r
Vi
/(
Ai/R
ai/r
+ 1
)2) (A.12)
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which generalizes to (4). Inserting (A.10) into (3) gives the utilities in (4). It can
be shown that the defender’s second-order condition for si for site i is satisﬁed.
Appendix B. Solving the game in Sec. 3
Starting with the second period, the attacker’s ﬁrst-order condition for Si implies
∂U
∂Si
=
siVi
(si + Si)2
−Ai = 0⇒ Si =
√
siVi
Ai
− si (B.1)
which is inserted into (5) to yield
u =
n∑
i=1
(√
siViAi − aisi
)
. (B.2)
Diﬀerentiating u with respect to si gives
∂u
∂si
=
√
AiVi
2
√
si
− ai = 0⇒ si = AiVi4a2i
(B.3)
which is inserted into (B.1) to yield Si in (6). Inserting the eﬀorts in (6) into (5)
gives the utilities in (6). The order in which the two agents compete for the n rents
is irrelevant. The attacker is deterred if Ai ≥ 2ai. To ensure the deterrence, it
suﬃces for the defender to choose si so that the attacker earns negative utility for
rent i. Using (5), this gives SiVisi+Si − AiSi ≤ 0, and hence si = Vi/Ai. The agents’
second-order conditions are
∂2U
∂S2i
= − 2siVi
(si + Si)3
< 0,
∂2u
∂s2i
= −
√
AiVi
4s3/2i
< 0 (B.4)
which are always satisﬁed.
Appendix C. Five distinguishing factors for the two models
First, with ﬁxed resources, the agents substitute eﬀorts across the sites and hence
the eﬀorts in (4) depend on all the model’s parameters. With variable resources,
each site is viewed independently, and hence the eﬀorts in (6) depend on only the
parameters for that site. Second, with ﬁxed resources, the agents’ eﬀorts in (4) are
proportional to r/ai and R/Ai, respectively, multiplied with a factor between 0 and
1, i.e., inﬂuenced by his resource divided by his unit cost. With variable resources,
the defender’s eﬀort in (6) is proportional to AiVi/a2i , quadratically inﬂuenced by
his unit cost, which reinforces the impact of diﬀerences in unit costs, whereas the
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attacker’s eﬀort in (6) is proportional to Vi and decreases to 0 as his unit cost
Ai increases toward 2ai. Unit costs are thus especially important with variable
resources.
Third, inserting ai = Ai into (4) and (6) gives
siB =
r
R
SiB, SiB =
R
Ai
r
RVi
/(
r
R + 1
)2
∑n
i=1
(
r
RVi
/(
r
R + 1
)2) ,
uB =
r
R
r
R + 1
n∑
i=1
Vi − r, UB = 1r
R + 1
n∑
i=1
Vi −R,
∂uB
∂r
=
R
∑n
i=1 Vi
(r + R)2
− 1 = 0⇒ r =
√√√√R n∑
i=1
Vi −R, ∂
2uB
∂r2
= −2R
∑n
i=1 Vi
(r + R)3
< 0,
∂UB
∂R
=
r
∑n
i=1 Vi
(r + R)2
− 1 = 0⇒ R =
√√√√r n∑
i=1
Vi − r, ∂
2UB
∂R2
= −2r
∑n
i=1 Vi
(r + R)3
< 0,
siW = SiW =
Vi
4Ai
, uW = UW =
n∑
i=1
Vi
4
(C.1)
where subscript B denotes ﬁxed resources and subscript W denotes no budget
constraints.
Hence with ﬁxed resources, the agents earn maximum utilities for an 
intermediate value of their own resource. If an agent’s budget resource is large, and 
since he is required to use his entire budget, he earns negative utility because of the 
budget cost. If an agent’s budget is low, he earns utility of low absolute magnitude as 
determined by (C.1). With variable resources, the agents always earn positive 
utilities since the optimization logic prevents negative utilities. The agents are 
prevented from incurring large costly eﬀorts, and the logic of the ratio form contest 
success function ensures that they incur positive eﬀorts since incurring no eﬀort 
guarantees zero utility.
Fifth, comparing (4) and (6), the agents prefer ﬁxed resources when
uB > uW ⇒ r <


n∑
i=1

 Ai/Rai/r
Ai/R
ai/r
+ 1
− Ai/ai
4

Vi if Ai
ai
≤ 2 ∀ i
n∑
i=1

 Ai/Rai/r
Ai/R
ai/r
+ 1
−
(
1− ai
Ai
)Vi if Ai
ai
≥ 2 ∀ i
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UB > UW ⇒ R <


n∑
i=1

 1
Ai/R
ai/r
+ 1
− (2 −Ai/ai)
2
4

Vi if Ai
ai
≤ 2 ∀ i
n∑
i=1
Vi
Ai/R
ai/r
+ 1
if
Ai
ai
≥ 2 ∀i
(C.2)
which are satisﬁed when the agents’ resources are not too large which is costly.
Equation (C.2) speciﬁes how a social planner can dictate upper bounds for the
agents’ resources which beneﬁt one or both of them, and prevent resource waste
which may occur when each agent maximizes utility individually without resource
constraints.
Property 3. The agents collectively prefer ﬁxed resources when the site values Vi
are large, when there are many sites n, and when the resources r and R are low, as
expressed in (C.2).
Proof. Follows from (C.2).
Collectively agents prefer ﬁxed resources when Vi and n are large, and r and
R are low, to limit their expenses. Agents’ desire to win many (large n) valuable
(large Vi) sites drives a second desire for a large resource (large r and R) which in
turn renders the budget constraints not binding, causing large expenses.
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